Chapter V
Guidelines for Interpretation
of the WTO Covered Agreements
OUTLINE
I Introduction
II Application of Arts. 31, 32 of the Vienna Convention
III WTO Rules on Conflicts: Effective Interpretation
IV The Status of Legitimate Expectations in Interpretation
I Introduction
According to Art. 11 of the DSU, the panel's role is to “make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. In the previous chapter, we have examined the general standard of review labeled as “an objective assessment” regarding “the facts of the case”; clearly, for panels to fulfil appropriately their functions as designated in Art. 11 of the DSU, it is also indiscerptible to make such an objective assessment of “the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. Therefore, the interpretation issue of the covered agreements arises. In this section, the author will scrutinize guidelines for interpretation applied under the WTO jurisprudence.
To resolve a particular dispute, before addressing the parties' arguments in detail, it is clearly necessary and appropriate to clarify the general issues concerning the interpretation of the relevant provisions and their application to the parties' claims. However, the complex nature of the covered agreements has given rise to difficulties in interpretation.
As noted previously, GATT/WTO jurisprudence should not be viewed in isolation from general principles developed in international law or most jurisdictions; and according to Art. 3.2 of the DSU, panels are bound by the “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” in their examination of the covered agreements. A number of recent adopted reports have repeatedly referred, as interpretative guidelines, to “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” as embodied in the text of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘Vienna Convention’), especially in its Arts. 31, 32. It is in accordance with these rules of treaty interpretation that panels or the Appellate Body have frequently examined the WTO provisions at issue, on the basis of the ordinary meaning of the terms of those provisions in their context, in the light of the object and purpose of the covered agreements and the WTO Agreement. These Vienna Convention articles provide as follows:
“Art. 31: General Rule of Interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
Art. 32 Supplementary Means of Interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”
II Application of Arts. 31, 32 of the Vienna Convention
Pursuant to Art. 31.1 of the Vienna Convention, the duty of a treaty interpreter is to determine the meaning of a term in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the term in its context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. As noted by the Appellate Body in its Report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages (DS8/DS10/DS11), “Article 31 of provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive process: ‘interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty’. The provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions”. And in US ? Shrimps (DS58), the Appellate Body accordingly states: “A treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular provision to be interpreted. It is in the words constituting that provision, read in their context, that the object and purpose of the states parties to the treaty must first be sought. Where the meaning imparted by the text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or where confirmation of the correctness of the reading of the text itself is desired, light from the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole may usefully be sought.”
More specifically, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules that: “Text, context and object-and-purpose correspond to well established textual, systemic and teleological methodologies of treaty interpretation, all of which typically come into play when interpreting complex provisions in multilateral treaties. For pragmatic reasons the normal usage, and we will follow this usage, is to start the interpretation from the ordinary meaning of the ‘raw’ text of the relevant treaty provisions and then seek to construe it in its context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose. However, the elements referred to in Article 31 - text, context and object-and-purpose as well as good faith - are to be viewed as one holistic rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. Context and object-and-purpose may often appear simply to confirm an interpretation seemingly derived from the ‘raw’ text. In reality it is always some context, even if unstated, that determines which meaning is to be taken as ‘ordinary’ and frequently it is impossible to give meaning, even ‘ordinary meaning’, without looking also at object-and-purpose. As noted by the Appellate Body: ‘Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive process: 'interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty'’. It adds, however, that ‘[t]he provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions’.” 1
In sum, as noted by the Panel in Canada-Automotive Industry (DS139/DS142), “understanding of these rules of interpretation is that, even though the text of a term is the starting-point for any interpretation, the meaning of a term cannot be found exclusively in that text; in seeking the meaning of a term, we also have to take account of its context and to consider the text of the term in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention explicitly refers to the ‘ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their [the terms'] context and in the light of its [the treaty's] object and purpose’. The three elements referred to in Article 31 - text, context and object and purpose - are to be viewed as one integrated rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. Of course, context and object and purpose may simply confirm the textual meaning of a term. In many cases, however, it is impossible to give meaning, even ‘ordinary meaning’, without looking also at the context and/or object and purpose”. 2
With regard to Art. 32 of the Vienna Convention, it is repeatedly ruled that, “[t]he application of these rules in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention will usually allow a treaty interpreter to establish the meaning of a term. However, if after applying Article 31 the meaning of the term remains ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, Article 32 allows a treaty interpreter to have recourse to ‘... supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion’. With regard to 'the circumstances of [the] conclusion' of a treaty, this permits, in appropriate cases, the examination of the historical background against which the treaty was negotiated.” 3
As a whole, under the WTO jurisprudence, with regard to the dispute among the parties over the appropriate legal analysis to be applied, as general principles or guidelines of interpretation, it is often begun with Art. 3.2 of the DSU. To go further, as noted by the Panel in Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, “the ‘customary rules of interpretation of public international law’ are those incorporated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). GATT panels have previously interpreted the GATT in accordance with the VCLT. The Panel noted that Article 3:2 DSU in fact codifies this previously-established practice”. Consequently, “the Panel concluded that the starting point of an interpretation of an international treaty, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in accordance with Article 31 VCLT, is the wording of the treaty. The wording should be interpreted in its context and in the light of the object and the purpose of the treaty as a whole and subsequent practice and agreements should be taken into account. Recourse to supplementary means of interpretation should be made exceptionally only under the conditions specified in Article 32 VCLT”. 4
In short, it is may be the case that, it is generally considered that the fundamental rules of treaty interpretation set out in Arts. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention have attained the status of rules of customary international law. In recent years, the jurisprudence of the Appellate Body and WTO panels has become one of the richest sources from which to receive guidance on their application.
III WTO Rules on Conflicts: Effective Interpretation
The Panel Report on Turkey-Textile and Clothing Products (DS34) states concerning the conflicts issue that: 5
“As a general principle, WTO obligations are cumulative and Members must comply with all of them at all times unless there is a formal ‘conflict’ between them. This flows from the fact that the WTO Agreement is a ‘Single Undertaking’. On the definition of conflict, it should be noted that: ‘… a conflict of law-making treaties arises only where simultaneous compliance with the obligations of different instruments is impossible. ... There is no conflict if the obligations of one instrument are stricter than, but not incompatible with, those of another, or if it is possible to comply with the obligations of one instrument by refraining from exercising a privilege or discretion accorded by another’.
This principle, also referred to by Japan in its third party submission, is in conformity with the public international law presumption against conflicts which was applied by the Appellate Body in Canada - Periodicals and in EC - Bananas III, when dealing with potential overlapping coverage of GATT 1994 and GATS, and by the panel in Indonesia - Autos, in respect of the provisions of Article III of GATT, the TRIMs Agreement and the SCM Agreement. In Guatemala - Cement, the Appellate Body when discussing the possibility of conflicts between the provisions of the Anti-dumping Agreement and the DSU, stated: ‘A special or additional provision should only be found to prevail over a provision of the DSU in a situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to a violation of the other provision, that is, in the case of a conflict between them’.
We recall the Panel's finding in Indonesia - Autos, a dispute where Indonesia was arguing that the measures under examination were subsidies and therefore the SCM Agreement being lex specialis, was the only ‘applicable law’ (to the exclusion of other WTO provisions): ‘14.28 In considering Indonesia's defence that there is a general conflict between the provisions of the SCM Agreement and those of Article III of GATT, and consequently that the SCM Agreement is the only applicable law, we recall first that in public international law there is a presumption against conflict. This presumption is especially relevant in the WTO context since all WTO agreements, including GATT 1994 which was modified by Understandings when judged necessary, were negotiated at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum. In this context we recall the principle of effective interpretation pursuant to which all provisions of a treaty (and in the WTO system all agreements) must be given meaning, using the ordinary meaning of words.’
In light of this general principle, we will consider whether Article XXIV authorizes measures which Articles XI and XIII of GATT and Article 2.4 of the ATC otherwise prohibit. In view of the presumption against conflicts, as recognized by panels and the Appellate Body, we bear in mind that to the extent possible, any interpretation of these provisions that would lead to a conflict between them should be avoided.”
It is clearly implied by the ruling above that, in the WTO system, any interpretation of the covered agreements that would lead to a conflict between them should be avoided. In this respect, as to WTO rules of conflicts, in the context that all WTO agreements were negotiated “at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum”, the principle of effective interpretation is recalled. What a principle is it?
As ruled by the Panel in Japan-Alcoholic Beverage (DS8/DS10/DS11), effective interpretation is a principle “whereby all provisions of a treaty must be, to the extent possible, given their full meaning so that parties to such a treaty can enforce their rights and obligations effectively…. this principle of interpretation prevents [the panel] from reaching a conclusion on the claims … or the defense …, or on the related provisions invoked by the parties, that would lead to a denial of either party's rights or obligations.” 6 This ruling is upheld by the Appellate Body when ruling that, “[a] fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation flowing from the general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31 is the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat). In United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, we noted that ‘[o]ne of the corollaries of the ‘general rule of interpretation’ in the Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility’.” 7
湖南省防汛管理办法
湖南省人民政府
湖南省防汛管理办法
湘政办发[1987]28号
第一章 总 则
第一条 为了做好防汛工作，保障人民生命财产安全和社会主义现代化建设的顺利进行，根据国家有关规定，制定本办法。
第二条 防汛工作应贯彻以防为主，防重于抢的方针。
第三条 凡在我省的一切单位和个人，都有维护防汛设施安全和参加防汛抢险的义务。
第四条 防汛工作必须按照集中领导、统一指挥、分级负责的原则，实行各级政府首长负责制。
县级以上人民政府设立防汛指挥部，其办事机构设在水利部门；城市市区人民政府防汛指挥部的办事机构设在城建部门。
防汛任务大的厂矿企业应建立防汛指挥机构，受当地人民政府防汛指挥部指挥。
第五条 各级防汛指挥部的主要职责：
（一）贯彻实施防汛工作的法规、政策；
（二）制定本级和审批下一级的防洪方案，审批水库防汛调度计划；
（三）及时向同级人民政府和上一级防汛指挥部报告本地区防汛工作情况；
（四）督促、检查防汛准备工作；
（五）筹集和管理防汛资金、物资；
（六）发布洪水预报、警报，下达防汛调度命令；
（七）组织防汛抢险队伍，统一指挥防汛抢险。
第六条 有关部门的防汛职责：
（一）水利部门负责洪道和所辖工程的防洪管理；
（二）电力部门负责所辖水电工程的防洪管理，保证防汛抢险、排涝所需电力供应；
（三）城建部门负责城市市区防洪工程的管理；
（四）气象部门负责及时提供雨情和气象预报及暴雨分析；
（五）水文部门负责及时提供水情、水情分析和洪水预报；
（六）物资、供销、商业、石油部门负责作好防汛物资、器材的储备和供应；
（七）交通、铁路部门负责汛期交通畅通，及时运送防汛抢险物资；
（八）邮电部门负责保证汛期通讯畅通；
（九）公安部门负责防汛抢险的治安保卫工作；
㈩其他有关部门负责按时完成分担的防汛任务。
第二章 洪道管理
第七条 本省境内的洪道，由各级人民政府水利部门管理；省界洪道按国家有关规定管理。
第八条 严禁任何单位和个人的下列行为：
（一）擅自改变洪道，侵占洪道面积；
（二）擅自拦河筑坝、围滩垦殖、穿堤或跨河建筑；
（三）擅自在防洪堤上建房；
（四）擅自种植妨碍泄洪的林木和芦苇等高杆作物；
（五）在防洪堤禁脚区修建有碍防洪安全和防汛抢险的设施；
（六）在洪道内倾倒垃圾、土石或其他废弃物等；
（七）损坏或侵占洪道、堤防上的测量标志、观测设备等防汛设施。
第九条 在洪道内兴建工程设施，均须服从江河流域规划，由建设单位提出建设项目对行洪影响的评估，经所在县级水利部门审查同意后，按基本建设程序报批。影响城市防洪安全的，要同时取得城建部门的同意。
在湘、资、沅、澧四水干流和洞庭湖洪道内兴建工程设施，须经省水利部门审查后，报省人民政府批准。
经批准修建的工程，建设单位应按国家有关规定采取防洪措施，并保持洪道行洪能力。因兴建工程而损坏洪道两岸堤防或威胁堤防安全的，建设单位应负责修复或采取补救措施。
第十条 在洪道内开采砂石、土料，除执行有关审批程序外，还须经当地水利部门同意，在指定的开采范围内按规定操作，不得阻碍行洪和危及堤防安全。
第三章 防汛抢险
第十一条 各级防汛指挥部都应制定防洪方案，经同级人民政府审核后报上一级防汛指挥部批准；跨行政区域的防洪方案，由相邻的防汛指挥部共同制定，报共同的上一级防汛指挥部批准；湘、资、沅、澧四水和洞庭湖区防御特大洪水方案，由省防汛指挥部制定，报省人民政府和中央防汛总指挥部批准。
经批准的防洪方案，必须严格执行。确需要改变时，须经原批准机关同意。
第十二条 湘、资、沅、澧四水控制站的保证水位，洞庭湖区大型堤垸的保证水位，分、蓄洪区的控制水位，由省水利部门提出，报省防汛指挥部审定；其他河流及堤垸的保证水位，由所在行署、州、市水利部门提出，报同级防汛指挥部审定，并报省防汛指挥部备案。
第十三条 大、中型及小（一）型水库防汛调度计划，分别由省、行署、州、市、县水利部门制定，经同级防汛指挥部审核，报上一级防汛指挥部批准；小（二）型水库的防汛调度计划，由所在县级水利部门制定，报同级防汛指挥部批准。
第十四条 湘、资、沅、澧四水或洞庭湖区达到警戒水位时，各级防汛指挥部负责人应进入第一线工作岗位；预报将出现大洪水时，各级政府主要负责人应进入第一线工作岗位。
第十五条 临洪大堤、大中型水库等影响重大的水利工程发生险情时，按照分级管理的原则，防汛指挥部负责人应进入现场指挥。
第十六条 大、中型水库泄洪要服从省防汛指挥部的统一调度。水库发生重大险情时，由水库管理单位按批准的紧急避险方案采取措施，并应立即报告省防汛指挥部和通知下游地方政府。
第十七条 当发生大洪水或特大洪水时，各级政府应按批准的防洪方案，进行分洪、蓄洪、滞洪，做好群众的转移、安置工作，确保适时分洪，任何单位和个人不得借故阻挠或拖延。
第十八条 防汛指挥部统一调度或按照防洪排涝工程设计及运行标准泄洪或排涝时，任何单位和个人必须严格执行调度命令，不准以任何借口进行阻拦、扒口或启闭闸门。
第十九条 遇大洪水或工程发生重大险情，防汛指挥部有权调度和使用可用于防汛抢险的物资、设备、器材、交通运输工具。防汛抢险结束后，由调用单位负责清退。
第二十条 抢险结束后，各级人民政府应当如实向上报告灾情，妥善做好救灾工作。
第四章 财物管理
第二十一条 防汛经费应本着依靠群众，自力更生和谁受益、谁负担的原则筹集。如遇特大洪水，国家酌情给予补助。
水利工程防汛抢险所需经费，纳入各工程管理单位水费、堤费预算，经主管部门审批后，按计划开支。
城市防洪经费，按国家有关规定执行。
第二十二条 防汛所需的物资应统筹安排，分级负责。凡国家统配的物资和设备，每年汛前由有关部门按照各级防汛指挥部提出的计划，在正常库存物资中控制储备。
第二十三条 各级防汛指挥部应建立健全防汛经费和物资的管理制度，做到专款专用，专物专用。
防汛物资应严加管理，防止偷盗、丢失、霉变、损坏。汛期结束后，各级防汛指挥部应对防汛物资及时清理、翻晒、维修、入库、造册登记，并逐级汇总上报。
第五章 奖励与惩罚
第二十四条 对认真贯彻执行本办法，在防汛抢险工作中作出显著成绩的单位或个人，由各级人民政府给予表彰和奖励。
第二十五条 违反本办法有下列行为之一者，由县级以上防汛指挥部给予处罚：
（一）在洪道内擅自修建工程的，责令限期拆除，恢复原状，并处以违章建设工程总造价1％至5％的罚款；对违章建设单位主管负责人和直接负责人分别处以本人月工资20％以下的罚款；因违章建设对防汛或其他单位造成损害的，由违章建设单位给予赔偿。
（二）擅自在防洪堤上建房的，责令限期拆除，恢复原状。
（三）擅自或不按指定范围在洪道内开采砂石、土料影响行洪的，责令停止开采；不听劝阻的，没收其全部收入，并可处10元至100元的罚款；威胁堤防安全造成损害的，责令赔偿。
（四）向洪道内倾倒垃圾、土石或其他废弃物的，责令限期清除，并按《中华人民共和国水污染防治法》有关规定处罚。
（五）在防洪堤禁脚区修建有碍堤防安全和防汛抢险的设施的，责令限期拆除；造成损害的，赔偿实际损失。
（六）在洪道内擅自种植林木、芦苇等高杆作物的，责令限期铲除；情节严重的，并处每亩10元至100元的罚款。
当事人对处罚决定不服的，可在接到处罚通知之日起15日内，向上一级防汛指挥部提出申诉。上一级防汛指挥部对申诉作出的处理决定，当事人必须执行。
第二十六条 违反或拒不执行防汛抢险调度命令和防汛方案，贻误时机或指挥错误，玩忽职守或临阵脱逃，挪用、盗窃、贪污防汛抢险款物、器材，盗窃、损坏、破坏防汛工程和水文、气象测报设施的，由当地防汛指挥部提请有关部门给予行政处分、治安管理处罚，直至依法追究刑事责任。
第六章 附 则
第二十七条 本办法所指洪道为通行洪水的江河、湖泊。有堤防的江河，是指按流域规划修建的两岸堤防之间的范围；无堤防的江河，即是其设计洪水位线以下部分。
第二十八条 县以上人民政府可根据本办法，结合本地具体情况，制定实施细则。
第二十九条 本办法自发布之日起施行。过去省人民政府发布的有关防汛抢险的规定，凡与本办法有抵触的，以本办法为准。
